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Impacts of the SURE Standing Disaster Assistance Program on Producer Risk 





This research investigates the potential effects of the row crop provisions of the standing disaster 
assistance program (SURE) in the 2008 Farm Bill.  Results suggest little impact on producer 
crop insurance purchase decisions, though the program does seem to provide an incentive for 
mid-level coverage.  Payments under the program should be expected to differ considerably 
across geographic regions and levels of diversification, with the program providing the greatest 
benefit to undiversified producers in more risky production regions.   
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Impacts of a Standing Disaster Payment Program on U.S. Crop Insurance 
 
In 1887 then U.S. President Grover Cleveland vetoed an emergency appropriation of $10,000 for 
drought victims in Texas.  He explained his decision by saying that the federal government had 
no “ . . . warrant in the Constitution . . . to indulge a benevolent and charitable sentiment through 
the appropriation of public funds . . . (for) relief of individual suffering which is in no manner 
properly related to the public service” (Barry, 1997:369).  Over time, public perceptions of the 
federal role in disaster relief changed considerably.  By the mid-1970s the federal government 
provided more than 70 percent of the disaster relief funding in the U.S. (Clary, 1985). 
The U.S. government’s role in providing agricultural disaster relief expanded greatly in 
1949 when Congress established a program that would provide low-interest loans to individual 
farmers and ranchers who suffered losses due to natural disasters.  Later the secretary of 
agriculture was given the authority to make direct disaster relief payments to producers who 
participated in federal price and income support programs.  This authority was suspended in 
1981 (and by legislation adopted in subsequent years) for all situations where federal crop 
insurance was available.  Due to the widespread availability of federal crop insurance, this 
implied that future federal agricultural disaster payments would require ad hoc authorizing 
legislation. 
  Since 1981, Congress provided such ad hoc legislation is most years.  Between 1987 and 
1994, more than 60 percent of U.S. farms received federal disaster payments at least once with 
many farms receiving payments every year (Barnett, 1999). In some cases the ad hoc legislation 
authorized disaster payments only for specific crops in specific areas that were affected by 
specific natural disasters.  In other cases, the legislation authorized payments for all crops in all 
areas that had been affected by any disaster (including the explosion of the space shuttle   4 
Columbia over Texas in 2003).  Payments have also been made to livestock producers (primarily 
for forage losses) and to crop producers who were affected by economic emergencies (low 
prices) rather than natural disasters.  All of these ad hoc payments were funded by off-budget 
emergency supplemental appropriations. 
  These ad hoc payments were also made in a context of increasing on-budget funding for 
subsidized crop insurance.  Crop insurance reform legislation was adopted in 1980, 1994, and 
2000 each time with the expressed intent of eliminating or at least reducing the need for ad hoc 
disaster payments (Glauber). These reforms generally increased crop insurance premium 
subsidies to stimulate higher levels of participation.  As a result the cost of the program to the 
government (indemnities net of premiums, premium subsidies, and delivery cost) rose 
considerably.   
  Despite the frequent implementation of ad hoc disaster payments, there was no standing 
program that provided disaster payments to farmers and ranchers in the U.S. after 1981.  This 
changed with passage of the Food Conservation and Energy Act of 2008 (hereafter referred to as 
the Farm Bill).  That bill includes the Supplemental Agricultural Disaster Assistance (SADA) 
program.  The SADA program is fairly comprehensive, including components to cover losses in 
crop production (the Supplemental Revenue Assistance or SURE program), livestock mortality 
due to adverse weather (Livestock Indemnity Payments), forage losses (Livestock Forage 
Disaster Program), orchard and nursery tree losses (Tree Assistance Program), and other 
production losses on livestock, honeybees, or farm-raised catfish (Emergency Assistance 
program).   
  This paper focuses on the commercial row-crop provisions of the SURE program.  The 
SURE program differs considerably from the standing disaster program that was in place prior to   5 
1981. For example, the pre-1981 program was based on yield losses. The SURE program is 
based on revenue losses. Also, the pre-1981 program provided compensation for losses on 
individual crops while SURE will provide compensation based on shortfalls in “whole farm” 
revenue, including all crops produced on the farm. 
   To be eligible for SURE payments, farms will be required to purchase at least the 
catastrophic level of federal crop insurance. The program will compensate farms for 60 percent 
of the difference between their disaster payment program guarantee and their realized total farm 
revenue. For purposes of this program, realized farm revenue includes market revenue, any crop 
insurance indemnities, 20 percent of any federal direct fixed payments, any federal counter-
cyclical payments (price or revenue, depending on which program the farm participates in)
 1, and 
any loan deficiency payments or marketing loan gains.   
The research presented in this paper analyzes the impact of the SURE program at the farm 
level under participation in either the current PCCP program or the new ACRE program.  
Specifically, the research: 
1)  Investigates the impact of the proposed standing disaster payment program on federal 
crop insurance purchase decisions; 
2)  Analyzes expected disaster payment benefits for different crops and regions; 
3)  Analyzes expected disaster payment benefits for different degrees of on-farm crop 
diversification; and 
                                                 
1 The 2008 Farm Bill allows producers to continue in the existing price counter-cyclical payment (PCCP) program 
or to opt into a new revenue counter-cyclical payment program called the Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) 
program.  Participation in the ACRE program entails additional changes to the parameters of other farm programs 
including the Marketing Loan program and the Direct Payment program.  These changes are discussed in detail in 
the following section.   6 
4)  Contrasts the SURE program with an alternative disaster payment structure, specifically 
focusing on how geographic differences in production risk will affect disaster program 
experience. 
Conceptual Framework 
When farmers plant crops they are making financial investments in a portfolio of enterprises that 
they hope will generate positive net income.  In this sense, farmers are no different than those 
who invest in stocks, bonds, or other financial assets. 
Consider a portfolio consisting of n different crop enterprises. The expected return on the 
portfolio is  
(1)     
n
i
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where  i r E  is the expected return for crop i,  i w is the proportion of the total value of the 






For a portfolio consisting of two crops, j and k, the variance in returns for the portfolio 
would be measured as: 
(2) 
where  k j,  is the correlation coefficient between returns on crop j and crop k. By changing the 
notation for variance from
2
crop to crop crop, , equation 2 can be generalized to allow for portfolios 
of n crops: 
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Following standard financial theory we assume that farmers manage their portfolios by 
making decisions that weigh expected returns against risk.  Specifically, it is assumed that 
k j k j k j k k j j portfolio w w w w ,
2 2 2 2 2 2  7 
farmers maximize a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function, which is represented 
mathematically as 
(4) 
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The farmer’s expected utility is
 
(5) 
1   r    if ) ln(     E(U)
and 1   r  if
1















where r is a risk aversion coefficient and ωt is the probability weight associated with each 
possible wealth outcome t.  If  0 W  represents initial wealth then  t t NR W W 0  where  t NR  is a 
stochastic annual net return, which in the present context would include returns from crop 
production, commodity program payments, crop insurance indemnities, and disaster program 
payments.  
The commodity program payments included in the analysis are Direct Payments (DPs), 
Loan Deficiency Payments (LDPs), and either Price Counter-Cyclical Payments (PCCPs) or 
Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) revenue counter-cyclical payments.  For each program 
crop, commodity program payments, crop insurance indemnities, and disaster program payments 
are modeled as follows.  The LDP is calculated as: 
(6)  i i i i i FY HA HP LR LDP ) , 0 max(  
where LRi is the loan rate, HPi is the harvest time cash price, HAi is harvested acres,  i FY  is the 
realized farm yield, and the subscript i indicates a specific crop.  For farms enrolled in the ACRE   8 
program, the loan rate is reduced by 30 percent in the calculation of LDPs.  The DP is calculated 
as: 
(7)  i i i i BY BA DPR DP % 3 . 83  
where DPRi is the direct payment rate (specified in the Farm Bill), BAi is the base acreage, and 
BYi is the base yield.  For farms enrolled in ACRE, direct payments are reduced by 20 percent 
from the value calculated in equation 7.  The PCCP is calculated as: 
(8)  i i i i i i i BY BA MYA LR DPR TP PCCP % 85 , max , 0 max  
where TPi is the target price, MYAi is the national marketing year average price, and all other 
variables are as defined previously
2.  ACRE payments are calculated as: 
(9)  , ] , 0 max[ i
i
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where φ is a dummy variable with a value of one if realized farm revenue is below the farm-level 
benchmark revenue and a value of zero otherwise; SREVBi is the benchmark state revenue 
calculated according to ACRE provisions;
3 SREVAi is actual state revenue to count under ACRE 
provisions;  i FY  is the farm-level benchmark yield;  i SY  is the state level benchmark yield; and 
ABAi is the base acreage to which the ACRE payment applies (see footnote 3). 
                                                 
2 It is technically possible for base yields for direct payments and base yields for counter-cyclical payments to differ; 
however, in this analysis, they are assumed to be the same.  
3 A full discussion of ACRE provisions is beyond the scope of this paper; however, a brief explanation of the broad 
outlines of the program is useful in the current context.  Basically, the ACRE program provides a payment to the 
producer when actual state revenue (as defined in the Farm Bill) falls below a benchmark level based on past state 
level yields and national marketing year average prices.  This state-level payment rate is scaled by the ratio of 
average farm yields to average state yields in order to determine the farm-specific payment rate.  The payment is 
made on base acres; however, base acres for this program are related to actual plantings.  The producer must plant a 
crop to get an ACRE payment.  The farm’s existing total base acres are allocated (on an annual basis) among the 
crops actually planted on the farm.  The result is that base acres on which an ACRE payment is calculated for any 
crop cannot exceed planted acres of that crop.  For a more detailed explanation of ACRE provisions see Zulauf 
(2008).   9 
Crop yield insurance is modeled at coverage levels ranging from 50 to 85 percent 
coverage in five percent increments – as in the actual crop insurance program.  Indemnities are 
computed as:   
(10)  i i i i i i IA FY APH CL EP INDEM , 0 max  
 
where EPi is the crop insurance pre-planting expected price, CLi is the coverage level selected, 
and APHi is the farm’s crop insurance actual production history (APH) yield, and IAi is the 
insured acreage.  The crop insurance products are assumed to be priced at the actuarially-fair rate 
adjusted by a 35% multiplicative load.
4  The current federal premium subsidy structure is 
imposed, which ranges from a 67 percent subsidy for the 50 percent coverage level to a 38 
percent subsidy for the 85 percent coverage level.
5  All acreage for a particular crop is assumed 
to be insured as one unit. 
The SURE program is designed to interface with crop insurance.  This is clearly observed 
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where δ is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the farm is enrolled in the current PCCP 
program and a value of 0 if the farm is enrolled in the new ACRE program.  The first term on the 
                                                 
4 This load factor is somewhat arbitrary; however, some load is required to account for the load that is applied to 
actual crop insurance rates as well as for other subjective factors that influence producers to purchase lower crop 
insurance coverage levels (e.g., downward-biased estimates of yield and/or price risk, perceived presence of yield 
trends, perception of moral hazard influencing rates, etc.).  For a more detailed discussion of subjective issues 
affecting crop insurance coverage level decisions see, Pease (1992), Eales, et al. (1990) and Egelkraut, et al. (2006). 
5 Free catastrophic coverage crop insurance is available with a 50 percent guarantee with the crop value capped at 55 
percent of the expected price.   10 
right-hand side of the equation is the guarantee equal to 115 percent of the insured value of all 
crops. Thus, choosing higher crop insurance coverage levels results in a higher disaster 
guarantee.
6  The second term on the right-hand side is the sum across crops of crop revenue, 15 
percent of all direct payments per acre, all PCCP or ACRE payments, all LDPs, and all crop 
insurance indemnities.   
Once net returns are calculated, certainty equivalents (CEs) can be calculated by 
inverting equation 4.  The CE represents the highest sure payment a decision maker would be 
willing to take to avoid a risky outcome (Hardaker, Huirne, and Anderson, 1997).  For any two 
alternatives l and m, if CEl > CEm, then alternative l is preferred to m.   
For this investigation, the optimal crop insurance coverage level is that which results in 
the highest CE.  Comparing optimal coverage levels with and without the proposed disaster 
payment will reveal what effect, if any, the disaster program is likely to have on insurance 
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where  ) (U E  is a value for expected utility calculated from equation 5. 
Data and Modeling 
A stochastic simulation model is developed to evaluate SURE program payments, crop insurance 
indemnities, and other farm program payments (i.e., direct payments, loan deficiency payments, 
price counter-cyclical payments, and revenue counter-cyclical payments) for a representative 
Mississippi cotton-soybean-corn farm, a representative Illinois soybean-corn farm, a 
                                                 
6 Note the guarantee is capped at 90% of expected crop revenue.   11 
representative Kansas wheat-corn farm, and a representative North Dakota wheat-corn farm.  
Certainty equivalents are calculated for each crop insurance coverage level from 50 to 85 percent 
both with and without the proposed disaster payment program to determine any impact of the 
program on optimal crop insurance purchase decisions by producers.  SURE payments were 
calculated assuming enrollment in the PCCP program and the ACRE program to see what effect 
this enrollment decision would have on SURE program outcomes.  For the Mississippi farm the 
effect of the disaster program is evaluated assuming production of all cotton, all soybeans, all 
corn, and a mix of cotton, soybeans and corn.  For the Illinois farm, the program is evaluated 
assuming production of all soybeans, all corn, and a mix of the two.  Similarly, for the Kansas 
and North Dakota farms, all wheat, all corn, and an equal mix of the two are modeled. 
As equation 9 makes clear, to accurately assess the potential impacts of the SURE 
program, it is necessary also to model returns from crop production, existing government 
programs, and crop insurance.  Simulating outcomes for these different revenue streams requires 
the simulation of a relatively large number of variables including futures prices, cash prices, 
farm-level yields, county-level yields, and state-level yields for each of the crops considered.    
The price data used in the model consist of beginning and ending prices as defined in the 
crop revenue coverage (CRC) insurance product provisions
7 as well as harvest time cash prices 
and marketing year average prices.  State-level, county-level and farm-level yields are simulated 
in this model.  Clearly, farm-level yields are required to calculate crop returns, crop insurance 
indemnities, and loan deficiency payments.  County-level yields are simulated in order to define 
                                                 
7 The CRC Commodity Exchange Endorsement describes how base (i.e., beginning) and harvest (i.e., ending) prices 
are to be established for each crop and location.  For example, for corn, in counties with a March 15 cancellation 
date for CRC policies, the base price is the average daily settlement price on the Chicago Board of Trade’s 
December corn contract during the month of February.  The harvest price is the average daily settlement price on 
that same contract during the month of October.  Additional details about the beginning and ending prices used in 
this study can be found in the CRC Commodity Exchange Endorsement (USDA Risk Management Agency).   12 
an event triggering a disaster program payment.  If county-level yields for any crop fall below a 
defined threshold, a disaster declaration will be assumed.  Under the SURE program, a disaster 
declaration for the county is a necessary first condition for producers in the county to be eligible 
for disaster payments.  State-level yields are necessary to calculate payments under the ACRE 
program. 
To simulate price outcomes, a beginning futures price was assumed for each crop.  
Futures price changes over the production season and harvest time basis values were simulated 
using parameters calculated from historic data obtained from the Commodity Research Bureau 
(CRB) database.  This information was used to calculate ending futures prices and harvest time 
cash prices (as well as a MYA price) for each crop.  Yields were simulated from a Beta 
distribution, with parameters of the distribution for each crop derived from historic data.  State 
and county yields are from the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s National Agricultural Statistics 
Service.  Farm yields series were simulated from the county-level series using the method 
described in Coble and Barnett (2007) to increase county-level yield variability to a level 
consistent with APH crop insurance rates for that county.  The farm yield series was simulated to 
have a correlation of 0.85 with the county yield series using the procedure described in Iman and 
Conover (1982)
8.  County yield data were taken from Bolivar County for Mississippi, from 
McLean County for Illinois, from Logan County for Kansas, and from Barnes County for North 
Dakota.  Correlations between yields, futures price changes, and basis values were also included 
in the simulation.  Data for Mississippi covered the period from 1979 through 2007.  Data for 
Illinois and Kansas covered the period from 1975 through 2007.  Data for North Dakota cover 
                                                 
8 The Iman and Conover procedure permits simulation of a data series that is correlated at the specified level with 
some existing series.  Thus, a farm-level yield series matching the length of the original county yield series was 
simulated using parameters based on the expanded variance of the county-level series.  These farm-level series are 
used in all subsequent analysis.     13 
the period from 1980 through 2007.  Table 1 provides names and descriptive statistics for the 
data used in the Mississippi representative farm model.   
A total of 100,000 correlated price changes, basis values, and yields were simulated for 
each representative farm.  Correlated price variables were simulated using the procedure 
described by Anderson, Harri, and Coble (2009).  In this procedure, a rank correlation matrix,  s, 
is calculated.  An eigen decomposition of  s results in a matrix of eigen values   and eigen 
vector  ˆ.  Correlated standard normal deviates (Z ˆ ) are generated using: 
(11)   ˆ ˆ Z Z , 
where Z is a vector of independent standard normal deviates.  These correlated standard normal 
deviates are converted to correlated uniform deviates on the (0,1) interval by a transformation on 
the standard normal cumulative distribution function.  The uniform deviates are used as 
probabilities in an inverse transformation on each of the marginal distributions for the variables 
being simulated (in this case, price changes, basis values, and yields).
9   
Simulated prices and yields, are used to calculate crop returns, crop insurance 
indemnities, government payments (e.g., LDPs, PCCPs and ACRE payments), and any payments 
under the SURE program.  To calculate the direct and counter-cyclical payments, crop base acres 
and yields must be assumed.  In this model, base acres and planted acres are assumed to be the 
same.  All three representative farms are assumed to have 1,500 acres of cropland. Base yields 
are assumed to be the same as farm-level average yields.  To compute net returns to crop 
production, regional cost of production estimates for 2007 published by USDA Economic 
Research Service were used. 
                                                 
9 For a more detailed description, see Phoon, Quek, and Huang (2004).   14 
Returns from all sources are converted to utility values using the constant relative risk 
aversion (CRRA) utility function shown in equation 4 with a risk aversion coefficient of 2, 
representing a moderately risk-averse decision maker.  Initial wealth is assumed to be 
$450,000.
10 Certainty equivalents (CEs) for crop insurance coverage levels from 50% to 85% are 
then calculated to define the optimal coverage level both with and without the SURE program.  
The model developed here can also be used to compare the relative impact of the SURE 
program across geographic regions and across different levels of diversification.  For each 
representative farm, average annual SURE payments are computed for each crop mix modeled.  
We hypothesize that, for the same crop, SURE payments will be lower for the Illinois 
representative farm than for any of the other farms due to the relatively low production risk for 
that state.  Likewise, we expect that SURE payments will be lower for more diversified farms 
since the payment trigger is based on whole farm revenue, which should be less variable on a 
diversified operation.  
To gain further insight into geographic differences in potential disaster payments, the 
model developed here is then modified to compute payments under a hypothetical program that 
provides protection at the level of 70 percent of expected whole farm revenue.
11  In this 
comparison, an actuarially-fair premium rate for 70 percent whole farm coverage is calculated 
for the Mississippi farm.  For the other farms, a grid search is performed to find the whole-farm 
coverage level that would correspond to the actuarially-fair premium rate for 70 percent 
coverage on the Mississippi farm.  This exercise illustrates the degree to which imposing 
                                                 
10 Results are not very sensitive to the level of initial wealth chosen.  This level of initial wealth was required to 
avoid negative ending wealth values in the cotton-only production scenario.  Negative ending wealth values 
preclude calculation of utility values with the CRRA utility function (see equation 4). 
11 The rationale for establishing a 70% whole farm coverage program is that such a program would be considered 
WTO green box.     15 
consistent coverage levels across dissimilar geographic regions actually leads to inequities in 
program payouts due to differences in production risk. 
Results and Discussion 
SURE Impact on Crop Insurance Coverage Levels 
Results showing calculated certainty equivalents at each insurance coverage level for each farm 
with a diversified crop mix and with the primary crop for that farm (i.e., Illinois corn, Kansas 
wheat, Mississippi cotton, and North Dakota wheat) are presented in Table 2. With respect to the 
issue of SURE effects on crop insurance purchase decisions, it does not appear that optimal crop 
insurance coverage levels are greatly influenced by the availability of the disaster program.  It is 
notable, however, that there are no instances of the SURE program resulting in higher optimal 
coverage levels
12.  In several instances, the optimal coverage level with SURE drops to the next 
lowest level relative to the optimal coverage level without SURE.
13  Results for secondary crop 
plantings (not reported but available upon request) were consistent with this finding – no 
instances of SURE resulting in higher optimal coverage but several instances of SURE resulting 
in lower optimal coverage.   
It is important to note that these changes in optimal coverage levels shown in Table 2 
reflect quite small changes in certainty equivalents (i.e., generally 1% difference or less).  These 
changes in certainty equivalents are due mainly to differences in SURE payments and net crop 
insurance indemnities across coverage levels.  These are shown in Table 3 for all states and all 
                                                 
12 There are several instances of the optimal coverage level increasing under the ACRE program compared to PCCP 
program.  This seems to reflect the fact that the crop insurance premiums are added back into the ACRE farm-level 
benchmark revenue.  This results in a higher ACRE revenue benchmark (and thus a higher expected ACRE 
payment) with higher coverage levels. 
13 Note that a grid search over finer increments of coverage would likely reveal additional smaller differences in the 
true optimal coverage; however, the coverage levels modeled here are the only ones that are relevant to the actual 
crop insurance purchase decision.   16 
crop combinations.  Note here that SURE payments are very small relative to the certainty 
equivalents in the preceding table.  SURE payments are a small portion of total revenue when 
compared to crop returns and even other program payments (such as the direct payment, ACRE 
payments, and PCCP payments).  It is not at all clear that differences in SURE payments across 
insurance coverage levels will make enough difference in producer welfare to actually influence 
coverage level decisions.  Certainly, the calculation of the SURE revenue guarantee – 
guaranteeing 115 percent of insured value but with a cap at 90% of expected revenue – suggests 
that the program makes the highest crop insurance coverage levels less attractive.   
  It does seem, on the other hand, that the calculation of the SURE guarantee, based as it is 
on insurance coverage level, could encourage higher coverage levels for producers initially 
starting from low coverage levels.  To investigate this possibility, the Illinois farm (with equal 
corn/soybean plantings) was simulated with premium rates loaded to force initial coverage to the 
60% level.  In this simulation, addition of the SURE program resulted in an increase of the 
optimal coverage level to 75%.  Again, with the SURE program in place, differences in certainty 
equivalents between the 60% and 75% coverage level were small (about 1.5% with the PCCP 
program and less than 1% with the ACRE program).  Still, taken together, these results on the 
impact of the SURE program on insurance coverage level present an interesting effect of the 
program.  It appears to provide some incentive (albeit relatively weak) for producers to move to 
mid-level crop insurance coverage – up from lower levels but down from higher levels.  To be 
more precise, the means by which the SURE program guarantee is calculated favors the 75% 
coverage level.  Above this level, the cap on SURE payments at 90% of expected revenue   17 
becomes binding
14; below this level, SURE payments are reduced by the lower SURE 
benchmark revenue. 
Relationship between SURE Payments and Other Program Payments 
A close look at the results in all states reveals some interesting points relative to the interaction 
between the SURE program and other farm programs.  Note in Table 3 that SURE payments are 
higher for a single crop compared to the diversified crop situation in all but two cases.  First, in 
the North Dakota wheat-only scenario with ACRE program participation, SURE payments at 
lower insurance coverage levels are slightly lower than for the wheat/corn combination.  
Differences are very small and appear to be related to differences in crop insurance premiums 
and ACRE program guarantees across coverage levels.  Specifically, for North Dakota wheat, 
crop insurance premiums at lower coverage levels are relatively high.
15  Since these premiums 
are added back to expected revenue to calculate the ACRE benchmark (see Zulauf, 2008), this 
increases the likelihood of receiving an ACRE payment, thus reducing average SURE payments. 
  The second case in which mono-crop SURE payments are lower than multi-crop SURE 
payments is the Mississippi cotton-only scenario with PCCP participation.  In fact, in this case, 
cotton-only SURE payments are substantially lower than for the multi-crop case.  It is notable as 
well that the cotton-only SURE payment with PCCP  is much lower than the cotton-only SURE 
payment under ACRE participation and much lower than SURE payment for corn-only or 
soybeans-only with either PCCP or ACRE participation.   
                                                 
14 This is not the same thing as saying that expected SURE payments are highest at the 75% coverage level.  Results 
in Table 3 demonstrate that this is not the case.  If SURE pays out more frequently at coverage levels above 75%, 
the expected SURE payment could be higher at those higher coverage levels.  The point is that in any given situation 
in which a SURE payment is made, there is no benefit (in terms of the SURE payment) to having a coverage level 
over 75%. 
15 Note that this refers to the actuarially fair premiums calculated within this simulation, not necessarily to actual 
premiums charged under the federal crop insurance program.   18 
This result points to a rather curious feature of the SURE program as it relates to other 
farm programs, particularly the PCCP and the marketing loan programs.  Under SURE, the 
farm’s payment trigger is essentially 115% of the farm’s total insurance liability.  Expectations 
of government program payments are not included in this benchmark revenue.  However, 
program payments are included in revenue to count at the end of the year.  When prices are low 
(as is the case with cotton), the SURE benchmark revenue is also low.  However, the likelihood 
of receiving substantial PCCPs and LDPs is high.  Thus, it becomes much more likely that 
revenue to count will exceed the SURE benchmark revenue, resulting in no SURE payment.  
When prices are high, the correspondence between benchmark revenue and revenue to count will 
be greater because PCCPs and LDPs will be a much less significant component of revenue.  The 
interesting result is that for producers in the PCCP program, SURE will be expected to pay out 
more when prices are high than when prices are low.   
The effect noted above will be reduced for producers enrolled in the ACRE program 
because ACRE price guarantees are not fixed.  In general, the likelihood of an ACRE payment 
should be about the same whether prices are high or low.  This is reflected in the results in Table 
3.  Except for the case of cotton-only in Mississippi, SURE payments are much higher under 
PCCP enrollment than under ACRE enrollment.  This suggests that ACRE and SURE payments 
are largely offsetting.  That is, when SURE pays out, ACRE is also generally paying out, thus 
reducing the amount of the SURE payment.  This is not necessarily true under the PCCP 
program since PCCP programs are based only on price and since the target price for PCCP 
payments is fixed.    
SURE Program Experience across Regions    19 
Results in Table 3 clearly demonstrate substantial differences in expected SURE payments 
across geographic regions.  Because of differences in expected revenue across states, mainly 
reflecting differences in expected yield, it is somewhat difficult to compare the whole-farm 
SURE payment levels.  To more clearly illustrate differences in payment levels across 
geographic regions, Table 4 shows SURE payments with PCCP participation as a percent of 
expected whole-farm revenue.  In these terms, SURE payments are smallest in Illinois and 
largest in Kansas, with Mississippi and North Dakota payments falling between these two.  This 
reflects differences in production risk across these different regions. 
To further investigate how differences in risk in different regions might affect disaster 
program experience, the model developed here was used to calculate an implied premium rate 
for a disaster program that makes payments whenever realized whole farm revenue is less than 
some percentage of the expected whole farm revenue.  That is, the producer would receive the 
following revenue guarantee (RG): 
(12) 
i
i i i ac p E y E CL RG ] [ ] [ , 
where E[yi] is the expected yield for crop i, E[pi] is the expected price for crop i (represented by 
the beginning futures price defined in crop insurance provisions), aci is the number of acres 
planted to crop i, and CL is the percent of expected revenue guaranteed by the program.  In this 
analysis, premium rates are calculated for coverage levels of 50, 60, and 70 percent.  To begin, in 
order to focus more directly on geographic differences in program payments, planting of only the 
dominant crop is considered: cotton for the Mississippi farm, corn for the Illinois farm, and 
wheat for the Kansas and North Dakota farms.  Premium rates estimated for each farm and 
coverage level are reported in Table 5. Not surprisingly, premium rates are much higher in   20 
Kansas than in Illinois, with rates for Mississippi and North Dakota falling between (with 
Mississippi rate closer to the Illinois rates and North Dakota rates closer to the Kansas rates).  
These results illustrate significant differences in premium rates across geographic regions due to 
differences in revenue risk across regions and, of course, crops.  
Further analysis was conducted to incorporate to effects of crop diversification on 
premium rate for the hypothetical disaster program covering 70 percent of expected whole farm 
revenue.  Table 6 reports actuarially fair premium rates for all possible crop combinations in 
each state.  As an example, consider the Mississippi representative farm.  In the case of a 
diversified crop mix with equal plantings of cotton, soybeans, and corn, the actuarially fair 
premium rate for a program covering 70 percent of expected crop revenue would be about 6.76 
percent.  This is considerably lower than the premium rate for any single crop planting.  This 
result holds in most cases.  (In North Dakota, the rate for corn/wheat is higher than for wheat 
alone, reflecting the relatively high risk on corn relative to wheat in that state).   
To further illustrate differences in risk in different areas, a grid search was performed to 
determine the coverage level that would correspond to the premium rate for 70% whole-farm 
coverage on the diversified Mississippi farm (i.e., 6.76 percent).  For the Illinois corn/soybean 
farm, that coverage level is about 94%.  For the North Dakota wheat/corn farm, the coverage 
level corresponding to the Mississippi premium rate is about 65%.  For the Kansas diversified 
farm, the coverage level corresponding to the Mississippi premium rate is just 56%.   
Differences in premium rates noted above largely reflect differences in production risk 
across regions.  For example, despite the fact that the Mississippi farm is more diversified than 
the Illinois farm, the implied premium rate for 70% coverage in Mississippi is too high for that 
same level of (whole-farm) coverage in Illinois.   Production risk is lower in the heart of the   21 
Corn Belt than in the Mid-South.  On the other hand, the Mississippi implied premium rate is too 
low for the Kansas farm, reflecting both the reduced amount of diversification on that farm and 
the higher risk associated with production in the Southern Plains.   
The significance of these results comparing implied premium rates is that they highlight 
the inherent inequity of government programs that impose consistent coverage levels (or revenue 
triggers) across regions that may differ greatly in terms of production risk.  Similarly, imposing 
consistent coverage across different levels of diversification can also be problematic.  Note the 
quite large difference between the actuarially-fair rates for the diversified Mississippi farm 
(6.76%) compared to the soybean-only Mississippi farm (11.99%).  Viewed another way, the 
actuarially fair premium rate for 70% coverage on the diversified Mississippi farm corresponds 
to a coverage level of just 52% in the case where soybeans is the only crop grown on the 
Mississippi farm. 
Summary and Conclusions 
The standing disaster payment program in the 2008 Farm Bill represents an attempt by the 
federal government to provide a systematic means of compensating producers for losses 
associated with production (as opposed to price) shortfalls.  Because the revenue trigger 
established under this proposed program is tied to the producer’s crop insurance coverage level 
and because the program would function in much the same way as a crop insurance product, it is 
quite possible that the program could influence crop insurance purchase decisions. 
  Results suggest that SURE payments could have some effect on the optimal crop 
insurance coverage level, moving producers toward mid-level coverage from either lower or 
higher levels.  Payments are, on average, small relative to crop revenues, other program   22 
payments, and insurance indemnities – thus, the actual impact of SURE payments on producer 
decisions is not likely to be that great.   
  Results also demonstrate interesting interactions between the SURE program and other 
federal commodity programs.  Surprisingly, for producers who participate in the PCCP program, 
the method of establishing SURE benchmark revenue (which ignores expected PCCP and 
marketing loan program payments) will result in lower SURE payments when prices are low and 
higher SURE payments when prices are high.  For producers participating in the ACRE program, 
SURE and ACRE payments will overlap to a substantial degree, generally resulting in small 
expected SURE payments.  These results provide a useful illustration of the complex inter-
relationships that now exist between the various farm programs. 
  Finally, results illustrate the influence of crop diversification and production risk on 
SURE payments.  In general, the program will pay more to less diversified operations in areas 
characterized by greater production risk.  This may seem an intuitively obvious finding, but it 
has implications for the distribution of farm program benefits that are often overlooked by policy 
makers.  To demonstrate the implications of this issue, a comparison of actuarially fair premium 
rates for Illinois, Kansas Mississippi, and North Dakota representative farms was conducted.  An 
implied actuarially fair premium rate for a hypothetical disaster program with a 70 percent 
whole-farm revenue guarantee was calculated for a diversified (cotton, soybeans, and corn) 
Mississippi farm.  That rate was found to be consistent with a coverage level of 94 percent for a 
diversified (soybeans and corn) Illinois farm, 65 percent for a diversified (wheat and corn) North 
Dakota farm, and 56 percent for a diversified (wheat and corn) Kansas farm.  This example 
highlights the inequity that is inherent in programs (such as the SURE program modeled in this 
study) that establish fixed coverage across very diverse production regions.  23 
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Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics of Data used in Representative Farm Models 
 
Note: Cotton prices given in cents/lb.  Soybean and corn prices given in $/bushel.  Illinois and Kansas data  
are from 1975-2007.  Mississippi data are from 1979-2007.  North Dakota data are from 1980 - 2007.   26 
 
Table 2.  SURE Program Effect on Optimal Crop Insurance Coverage Levels 
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Table 3.  Crop Insurance Indemnities and SURE Payments at Various Coverage Levels under 
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Table 5.  Actuarially Fair Premium Rates for Three Different Expected Revenue Coverage 
Levels on Representative Mississippi, Illinois, Kansas, and North Dakota Farms
a 
Coverage Level  Illinois  Kansas  Mississippi  North Dakota 
50%  0.019%  7.814%  2.692%  2.610% 
60%  0.248%  10.805%  5.143%  4.892% 
70%  1.110%  13.932%  8.179%  7.749% 
a Planting is assumed to be to a single crop: cotton for the Mississippi farm, corn for the Illinois farm, and wheat for 
the Kansas and North Dakota farms. 
 
 
Table 6. Actuarially Fair Premium Rates for 70% Whole Farm Revenue  
Coverage by State and Crop Combination 
Crops Grown  Illinois  Kansas  Mississippi  North Dakota 
Corn  1.110%  17.929%  9.533%  13.754% 
Cotton      8.179% 
Soybeans  1.341%    11.990% 
Wheat    13.932%    7.749% 
Corn/Cotton      6.700% 
Corn/Soybeans  0.849%    8.737% 
Corn/Wheat    10.954%    8.014%     
Corn/Cotton/Soybeans      6.758% 
Cotton/Soybeans      7.394% 